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INTRODUCTION
“[O]ur system of democracy teaches that the will of the people, important as
it is, does not reign absolute but must be kept in harmony with our Constitution.”
—Judge Thelton Henderson1
Imagine the voters of South Dakota—the first state to adopt initiative and
referendum2 on a statewide level—mounted a successful campaign to amend the
state constitution as follows: Any law regarding the spending of state funds in public
education for noncitizens shall require a supermajority in both Houses for enactment. Prior
* Margaux Poueymirou is a 2015 graduate of the University of California, Irvine School of Law. She
would like to thank Erwin Chemerinsky, Mario Barnes, Mark Rosenbaum, and Nicholas Hartmann
who each contributed to this Note in their own great ways. Thanks as well to the Law Review for their
attentive and thorough assistance.
1. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1490 (N.D. Cal. 1996), vacated, 110 F.3d
1431 (9th Cir. 1997).
2. An initiative enables a prescribed number of voters in a state or local community to place an
amendment or proposal on the ballot for acceptance by the voters in that locality. A referendum is a
device that requires voters of a state or community to approve of specified legislative enactments before
they become law. See Priscilla F. Gunn, Initiatives and Referendums: Direct Democracy and Minority
Interests, 22 URB. L. ANN. 135, 135 nn.1–2 (1981) (citing GEORGE S. BLAIR, AMERICAN
LEGISLATURES: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 392 (1967)).
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to this amendment, laws affecting the rights of noncitizens, like all other laws in the
state, required your standard simple majority for enactment. By facially singling out
a suspect class (noncitizens) for unique and unfair treatment, this initiative would
expressly violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The question this Note explores, however, is whether an additional equal
protection claim could be raised in relation to the way the initiative restructures the
political process. This restructuring occurs in two ways: first, by embedding the
initiative’s repeal in the state constitution; second, by requiring a supermajority for
the enactment of any future spending laws regarding a particular class of individuals.
In so doing, the initiative creates comparative structural burdens within the political
process for individuals seeking to advance legislation that might be to their benefit
or to the benefit of noncitizens living in the state. In order to do away with the
supermajority requirement, the state constitution would have to be reamended; in
order to pass a law that altered state spending on public education in relation to
noncitizens, a supermajority would have to succeed.
Although it is true that if citizens can amend state constitutions, they can
reamend them as well, there is still something acutely troubling about voters
adopting laws that are procedurally more difficult for future voters to amend, repeal,
or modify. This is particularly the case when such laws affect the rights of minority
groups that have been historically disenfranchised within the political system. When
these laws are couched in facially neutral language, they will inevitably escape
heightened judicial review so long as strict scrutiny requires evidence of
discriminatory intent—a nearly impossible threshold to meet in relation to citizendriven referenda and ballot initiatives.
This Note focuses on a series of cases comprising the “‘political process’
doctrine,”3 in which the Supreme Court developed a unique or unconventional
form of equal protection analysis to respond to various forms of “political
restructuring” that affected minority rights.4 All of the cases involved citizen-driven
initiatives that altered sources and avenues of decision-making power in relation to
certain social policy issues, ranging from fair housing to affirmative action. In each
instance, the alteration of decision-making power made it more difficult for certain
individuals to adopt future legislation, change social policy, or engage in successful
advocacy in relation to particular issues.
Part II of this Note traces the history of the political process doctrine.
Beginning with the seminal Supreme Court cases from which this mode of analysis
emerged, this section examines the ways that courts developed an equal protection

3. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1632 (2014). Courts have
invariably used different terms for the same idea, ranging from the “political restructuring doctrine,”
e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 495 (6th
Cir. 2012), to the “Hunter Principle” in reference to Hunter v. Erickson, from which this approach to
equal protection jurisprudence first emerged, see Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
4. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392–93;
Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431.
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framework to respond to a unique equal protection concern regarding minority
groups and their access to and strength within the political process. Part III
examines the controversy surrounding Proposition 2, Michigan’s Civil Rights
Initiative and the Supreme Court’s decision in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action.5 Part IV examines Schuette’s afterlife in the same-sex marriage
cases and the tension between direct democracy and judicial review. Finally, Part V
proposes a new framework for honoring the doctrine’s central objectives without
succumbing to the same legal vulnerabilities.
II. THE BIRTH OF A DOCTRINE
The political process doctrine originates with the 1969 Supreme Court case
Hunter v. Erickson.6 But it is also rooted in, or foreshadowed by, the “most
celebrated footnote in constitutional law,”7 United States v. Carolene Products’
footnote four, from which our tiers of scrutiny emerged.8 Indeed, as Justice
Sotomayor stated in her dissent in Schuette: “The values identified in Carolene
Products lie at the heart of the political-process doctrine.”9
Writing for the Court in Carolene Products, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone alluded
to laws or conditions that did not enjoy “a presumption of constitutionality”10 such
that the government must bear the burden of defending the law. This included
“legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”11 The Court stated that
such legislation should be “subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation.”12 Additionally, the Court singled out “prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities” as a “special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.”13 The Court’s recognition of the need for heightened judicial review
coalesced, then, with a unique concern for protecting the integrity of the political
process and minority voices within it. In essence, Carolene Products reinforced a
belief in “the need for courts to check defects in pluralist democracy, by monitoring
both its processes and the products—by clearing direct obstacles to participation

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623.
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV 1087, 1087 (1982).
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1668.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 148.
Id. at 152 n.4.
Id.
Id.
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and by paying close attention to laws that target groups most likely to be excluded
from ordinary pluralistic bargaining.”14
If Carolene Products foreshadowed the political process doctrine, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hunter is credited with its true creation. Indeed, later cases, when
analyzing comparable equal protection political process claims, employed the phrase
“Hunter principle”15 or “Hunter doctrine”16 to situate their analyses within
appropriate case law.17
The central issue in Hunter was whether the City of Akron, Ohio, violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it amended its city
charter to prevent the city council from implementing any housing ordinance that
dealt with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination without the approval of the
majority of Akron’s voters. Nellie Hunter brought the action after a real estate agent
informed her that he was under orders not to show any homes to African
Americans.18 She reported this to the Commission on Equal Housing, which had
been set up to enforce a recently enacted fair housing ordinance, and was told that
the ordinance was no longer viable due to Section 137. Adopted in the wake of the
city council’s enactment of fair housing legislation to address the gross disparities
in the housing market that disproportionately affected the City’s African American
community, Section 137 amended the city charter to ensure that voters played
watchdog whenever housing legislation that contemplated racial integration was
under consideration.19
In an 8–1 decision, the Supreme Court held that the charter amendment
violated equal protection.20 Prior to Section 137, no other ordinance required
majority approval before going into effect. Therefore, the amendment not only
repealed existing antidiscrimination housing legislation, it also altered the existent
political process by “[drawing] a distinction between those groups who sought the
law’s protection against racial, religious or ancestral discriminations in the sale and
rental of real estate and those who sought to regulate real property transactions in

14. Daniel P. Tokaji & Mark D. Rosenbaum, Promoting Equality by Protecting Local Power: A
Neo-Federalist Challenge to State Affirmative Action Bans, 10 STAN. L. & POL’ Y REV. 129, 136 (1999);
see also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 802–03 (2006) (arguing that Carolene Products underscores the
“notion that courts should police the political process for improperly motivated legislation” and that
this “has become a prominent justification for judicial application of heightened review”).
15. See, e.g., Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710, 719 ( W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 402 U.S. 935 (1971),
aff’d sub nom., Chropowicki v. Lee, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 616 F.2d 1381, 1390 n.15
(9th Cir. 1980) (“We need not decide whether a statute explicitly singling out and prohibiting
affirmative action programs would be facially neutral or would fall under the doctrine of Hunter
v. Erickson.”) (citation omitted).
17. See, e.g., Seattle, 458 U.S. at 469, 473.
18. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 393.
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the pursuit of other ends.”21 In essence, Section 137 forced the former group to run
a “gantlet.”22
The Court made several significant observations that later cases have
employed when articulating and applying the political process doctrine. First, it
stated that “treating racial housing matters differently from other racial and housing
matters” created an “explicitly racial classification” and thus must be evaluated
under the “most rigid scrutiny.”23
Second, the Court emphasized the law’s disproportionate impact on minority
groups and the “special burden” it placed on “racial minorities within the
governmental process.”24 Tellingly, these burdens were analogized to voting rights
cases including Anderson v. Martin25 where the Court had held that a law requiring
candidates to specify their race on the ballot was unconstitutional.26 The Hunter
Court also likened the impact of Section 137 to efforts to deny individuals a right
to vote on an equal basis with others.27 As the Court stated, “the State may no more
disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in
its behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote or give any group a smaller
representation than another of comparable size.”28 In so doing, the Court developed
a vocabulary for an equal protection analysis that positioned itself within
contemporaneous voting rights and legislative apportionment cases.
Third, the Court addressed the potential significance that Section 137 was
enacted via the ballot process: although the “State may distribute legislative power
as it desires,” the State cannot adopt a legislative structure that violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the implementation of legislative change through
popular referendum does not immunize the State from judicial review.29 As the
Court stressed, the sovereignty of the people remains subject to constitutional
limitations. Because the City failed to justify this classification, Section 137 was held
to be unconstitutional.30
In Justice Harlan’s concurrence, he argued that laws defining “the powers of
political institutions fall into two classes” for equal protection purposes: laws
seeking to make it more difficult for racial and religious minorities to further their
political aims, and laws “designed with the aim of providing a just framework within
which the diverse political groups in our society may fairly compete and [which] are
not enacted with the purpose of assisting one particular group in its struggle with

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 390.
Id.
Id. at 392 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
Id. at 391.
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 404 (1964).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 392–93.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 393.
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its political opponents.”31 Justice Harlan’s central critique of Section 137 was that it
had been adopted not on “the basis of any general principle” but, instead, had the
“clear purpose” of making it more onerous for certain racial and religious groups to
participate in the political process.32
The lone dissenter, Justice Black, argued that the Court had grossly
overreached its authority by refusing to allow a state to repeal laws deemed unwise.
The Justice analogized the Court’s application “of the Equal Protection Clause to
bar States from repealing laws that the Court wants the States to retain” with the
Court’s development of what he considered equally problematic: substantive due
process.33 Additionally, the Justice found the Majority’s reliance on voting cases to
be terribly misguided. Instead of disenfranchising African American voters, Section
137 did the opposite in his opinion: it gave the voters an opportunity to have a say
in fair housing legislation. Thus, rather than undermining voter interests, Section
137 protected them.34
A central theme underscoring Hunter, which appeared in each opinion to
varying degrees, was the relationship between direct democracy and judicial review.
Additionally, the Justices grappled with different modes of defining what
constituted a racial classification. As Professor Sunstein suggested in his analysis of
Hunter, “[t]he true lesson of Hunter is that there is a category of classifications that
qualify neither as facially neutral nor as facially discriminatory and that, while not as
suspicious as the latter, ought not to receive the deference due to the former.”35
A. Applications of the Hunter Principle
In the fourteen-year period following Hunter and preceding Washington
v. Seattle School District No. 1,36 the next major case to develop the doctrine, several
federal and state courts relied upon Hunter to address and frame a variety of equal
protection challenges.37 Courts frequently cited the case for the proposition that
31. Id. at 393 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 395.
33. Id. at 396–97 (Black, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 397.
35. Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982
SUP. CT. REV. 127, 150 (1982).
36. Seattle, 458 U.S. 457.
37. See, e.g., Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir. 1980) (pointing to Hunter to articulate
that “[i]f the rigors of the governmental or administrative process are imposed upon certain persons
with an intent to burden, hinder, or punish them by reason of their race or national origin, then this
imposition constitutes a denial of equal protection, notwithstanding the right of the affected persons to
secure the benefits they seek by pursuing further legal procedures”) (citation omitted); Jones
v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1012 (5th Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted) (citing Hunter for the proposition
that “[i]n the inherently coercive setting of a jail, it is evident to us that the withdrawal of decisionmaking by the public officials for only part of the jail amounts to impermissible racial segregation of
prisoners.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on reh’g, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981), overruled by Int’l Woodworkers
of Am., AFL-CIO & its Local No. 5-376 v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986);
Bulluck v. Washington, 468 F.2d 1096, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The principle of Hunter is that the
statute creates an ‘explicitly racial classification’ whenever it differentiates between the treatment of
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when a neutral law adversely impacts a minority group, this is sufficient for
sustaining an equal protection claim. For example, in the 1971 Supreme Court case
Whitcomb v. Chavis—which involved an equal protection challenge to a state statute
that diluted black voting strength by establishing Marion County, Indiana, as a
multi-member district—the dissent drew analogies to Hunter, describing it as a case
decided by the “basic principle” that “invidious effects” and not simply “racial
motivat[ion]” are enough to establish an equal protection violation.38
However, if certain courts interpreted Hunter as a discriminatory impact case,
others treated it as facilitating a new framework for determining the existence of a
racial classification. This is evident in Lee v. Nyquist, where a three-judge panel
struck down a newly amended section of the N.Y. Education Code that forbade
assigning students to different school districts in order to achieve racial balance
“except with the approval of a local elected board or upon parental consent . . . .”39
Prior to passage of the amendment, the Commissioner, state education officials,
and school boards retained plenary authority over the decision making pertaining
to the schools, including issues of attendance, maintenance of districts, and student
assignments in all matters. Drawing upon Hunter to frame the substance of the equal
protection violation at issue, the panel explained that “[the amendment] create[d] a
single exception to the broad supervisory powers the state Commissioner of
Education exercises over local public education”40 and that whenever a law
“differentiates between the treatment of problems involving racial matters and that
afforded other problems in the same area,” the law’s restructuring of the political
process creates a racial classification.41
Hunter was interpreted more as a case about race than a case about the integrity
of the political process. This is evident in James v. Valtierra, a decision authored by
Justice Black, the lone dissenter in Hunter.42 Valtierra involved an equal protection
challenge to a state constitutional amendment that brought low-income public
housing decisions within the referendum process.43 The amendment was adopted
in the wake of a California Supreme Court decision that held “local authorities’
decisions on seeking federal aid for public housing projects were ‘executive’ and
‘administrative,’ not ‘legislative,’ and therefore the state constitution’s referendum
provisions did not apply to these actions.”44 In response to this determination,
California voters amended the state constitution to ensure any decision to build a

problems involving racial matters and that afforded other problems in the same area.”); Westbrook
v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 773 (1970) (relying upon Hunter to strike down ballot initiatives that “require[d]
a two-thirds rather than a simple mathematical majority to approve the incurring of bonded
indebtedness . . . .”).
38. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 178 (1971).
39. Lee, 402 U.S. 935.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. (footnote omitted).
42. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 138 (1971).
43. Id. at 138–39.
44. Id. at 138 (footnote omitted).
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low-rent housing project received approval by a majority of those living in the
community. Low-rent housing was singled out for mandatory referendums, while
all other kinds of publicly assisted housing required no such approval. In upholding
the state constitutional amendment and thus reversing the district court, Justice
Black rejected the lower court’s reliance on Hunter.45 Because the state
constitutional amendment in Valtierra involved no racial classification, Hunter was
inapposite. Justice Black’s rejection of Hunter, therefore, suggests that the political
process doctrine only applied when racial classifications were at issue. Comparative
structural burdens within the political process that did not involve race, or a suspect
class, were unable, standing alone, to sustain an equal protection challenge.46
B. Rearticulating the Hunter Principle
The first significant case to expand on the Hunter principle, however, was
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.47 It involved an initiative that had been
adopted to defeat a desegregation program implemented in the 1978–79 academic
year in Seattle after community groups threatened to sue the mayor for failing to
facilitate meaningful desegregation efforts in the schools.48 Known as Initiative 350,
it provided that no school board could directly or indirectly require students to
attend schools that were not geographically closest to the students’ places of
residence: thus, on its face, the initiative employed racially neutral language despite
pertaining wholly to racial matters.49
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the Initiative on equal
protection grounds, holding that it curtailed the ability of minorities to fully
participate in the political life of their communities.50 Acknowledging that equal
protection extends to those instances where the political structure “subtly distorts
governmental processes in such a way as to place special burdens on the ability of
45. Id. at 140.
46. In a Ninth Circuit case, Valeria v. Davis, the court interpreted what it termed “political
structure” equal protection as only applicable to “reallocation[s] of political decision making . . . when
there is evidence of purposeful racial discrimination.” 307 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002). The court
stated that conventional equal protection analysis and political restructure analysis both required
“demonstrable evidence of purposeful racial discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted).
47. 458 U.S. 457.
48. Id. at 462.
49. Id. The Initiative made an exception for those with special education needs or who could
demonstrate health and safety hazards between their place of residence and the nearest school. Id. It
was held to be unconstitutional by both the district court and the Ninth Circuit, with both courts relying
upon Hunter and Nyquist to support their reasoning. Id. at 466. The Ninth Circuit stated that subjecting
desegregative student assignments to unique treatment—that is, by permitting busing for nonracial
reasons but forbidding it for racial reasons—the Initiative “create[d] a constitutionally-suspect racial
classification and radically restructure[d] the political process of Washington by allowing a state-wide
majority to usurp traditional local authority over local school board educational policies.” Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State of Wash., 633 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1980). To this extent, the Ninth Circuit
adopted Hunter ’s articulation of what constituted an explicit racial classification sufficient to compel
strict scrutiny. But it also went further with its emphasis on the impermissible restructuring of local
political processes, a point that later cases would seize on when advancing the doctrine.
50. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 467.
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minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation,”51 the Court spoke approvingly of
Hunter where this principle had “received its clearest expression”52:
[T]he political majority may generally restructure the political process to
place obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of
governmental action. But a different analysis is required when the State
allocates governmental power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial
nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process.53
The Hunter principle was described, then, as a different analytical approach to
an equal protection challenge, rather than merely a different substantive posture.
The Court juxtaposed this formulation of nonneutrality with Justice Harlan’s
example of the executive veto in Hunter, which applied to all and which could, in
certain instances, disproportionately impact a minority group. Nonneutrality, on the
other hand, required a different and more heightened analysis, because when “the
racial nature of an issue [is used] to define the governmental decisionmaking
structure . . . [that] impos[es] substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities.”54
Seattle’s articulation of the dangers of political restructuring rested less so on a
discriminatory impact theory and more on the role that race played in restructuring
a decision making process: under Seattle, the Hunter doctrine was catalyzed when
the “racial nature” of a decision fixed the terms for changing the existent political
process.55
The second major case to expand the Hunter principle56 and, in many respects,
the true predecessor of Schuette, was Coalition for Economic Equity
v. Wilson,57 which, like Schuette, addressed the constitutionality of a state
constitutional amendment banning affirmative action or the granting of
“preferential treatment” to “any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting.”58 Judge Thelton Henderson’s opinion represents
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 470 (emphasis in original).
54. Id.
55. See Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and
the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1029 (1996).
56. The U.S. Supreme Court also addressed the political process doctrine in Crawford v. Bd. of
Educ. of L.A., 458 U.S. 527, 540–41 (1982), where it rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance upon Hunter
because the state constitutional amendment in Crawford conformed the state’s desegregation busing
policy to the federal standard.
57. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1493, vacated, 110 F.3d 1431. Judge Henderson later characterized
his opinion in this case as “probably as careful a decision as I’ve ever drawn up.” Howard Mintz, Federal
Judge Thelton Henderson: Bay Area Legal Legend Takes on Oakland Police Case, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_22169178/federal-judgethelton-henderson-bay-area-legal-legend [https://perma.cc/C9AQ-8CP9].
58. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1488 (addressing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a)). The amendment
contains three exceptions to prohibitions on race- and sex-conscious affirmative action programs: sexbased bona fide occupational qualifications, the preservation of existing consent decrees,
and race- and sex-conscious actions required as a condition of eligibility for federal funding.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (c)–(e).
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the incarnation of the “political restructuring doctrine” or what he referred to as the
Seattle-Hunter doctrine.59 This new description of the doctrine reflects an
understanding that Seattle did not simply appropriate Hunter; it expanded on it.
Underscoring the Supreme Court’s decision in Seattle, Judge Henderson
described the new doctrine as standing for the “simple but central principle” that
“[t]he political majority may generally restructure the political process to place
obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of governmental
action. [But] the State [may not] allocate governmental power nonneutrally by
explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking
process.”60 Deriving a framework from Hunter and Seattle which he, in turn, applied
to Proposition 209, Judge Henderson pushed what he identified as a “principle”
closer toward the status of a legal doctrine, “designed to determine whether facially
neutral enactments single out race and gender issues for unique political burdens,
and thus are suspect classifications.”61
Coalition for Economic Equity was filed on November 6, 1996, a day after
California voters passed Proposition 209. Prior to Election Day, registered voters
received a California Ballot Pamphlet created by a nonpartisan California Legislative
Analyst’s Office charged with analyzing each statewide initiative on the ballot that
year. The Pamphlet included information underscoring how Proposition 209 would
effectively eliminate state and local government race- and sex-conscious affirmative
action programs, which aimed “to increase opportunities for various groups—
including women and racial and ethnic minority groups.”62 Furthermore, the
Pamphlet included “partisan arguments submitted by proponents and opponents
of the initiative” aimed at educating the electorate.63 Proponents of the Proposition
spoke of ending “REVERSE DISCRIMINATION” in order to avoid a parade of
horribles, and framed the Proposition as a modern day incarnation of the 1960s
Civil Rights Movement.64 Opponents, on the other hand, explained how the
Proposition would “put[ ] the brakes on expanding opportunities for people in
need” by eliminating programs that had helped minorities and women on their path
toward equality.65 This debate attracted national attention. At the time, Bill Clinton
was running for his second term of office against Senator Bob Dole. Both

59. Id. at 1499–1510.
60. Id. at 1500 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S. at 470).
61. Id. at 1503.
62. Id. at 1493. For example, the Pamphlet addressed the potential impact of Proposition 209
on admissions to state public universities and the possibility of “fundamental changes to[ ] voluntary
desegregation programs run by school districts . . . includ[ing] the special funding given to (1) ‘magnet’
schools (in those cases where race or ethnicity are preferential factors in the admission of students to
the schools), and (2) designated ‘racially isolated minority schools’ that are located in areas with high
proportions of racial or ethnic minorities . . . .” Id. at 1493–94.
63. Id. at 1494.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1494–95.
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candidates included their position on Proposition 209 as a part of their party
platforms that year.66
Had the Proposition mentioned nothing of preferential treatment, it would
have been uncontroversial and unnecessary, merely mimicking the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its guarantee of equal protection. However, as the
district court stated: “[T]he people of California meant to do something more than
simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209.”67 By prohibiting
state government entities from adopting race-conscious policies designed to address
past and present discrimination—policies that had already passed the most exacting
form of judicial review—Judge Henderson interpreted the Proposition as a cunning
attempt to strip minorities and women of political leverage.
In order to demonstrate how the Proposition restructured the political process
along impermissible racial lines, the court derived a framework from Hunter and
Seattle for evaluating when the removal of authority to address a racial problem
created a racial classification in itself.68 This framework dispensed with the intent
requirement inaugurated in Washington v. Davis69 and affirmed in Arlington Heights.70
These cases established that “[p]roof of a racially discriminatory intent or purpose
is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”71 However, in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Supreme Court held that the existence of a
racial classification, irrespective of proof of animus, compelled strict scrutiny under
equal protection analysis.72 Given the intrinsic problems with proving
discriminatory animus in the context of a voter initiative, the district court focused
on the ability of facially neutral language to operate as a racial classification.73
Borrowing from Seattle, the court stated that one must look to whether an initiative
singled out an issue that was of special concern for minorities and “imposed special
political burdens on those who supported the issue.”74 Proof of animus was
therefore replaced with a species of disparate impact analysis, specifically tailored
to claims concerning equal access to the political process.

66. 1996 Democratic Party Platform, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29611 [https://perma.cc/QU8R-4AVU] (last visited
Nov. 11, 2016); 1996 Republican Party Platform, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT , http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25848 [https://perma.cc/5RCB-KQLR] (last visited Nov. 11,
2016).
67. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1489. Two central legal issues were raised in the case: first, a claim
about the integrity of the political process and the rights of women and minorities to participate in the
political process; and second, a claim brought under the Supremacy Clause that the Proposition
frustrated the State’s ability to comply with Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. Id. at 1489–90.
68. Id. at 1499–1504.
69. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
70. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
71. Id.
72. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995).
73. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1500–01.
74. Id. at 1500 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S. at 485).
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In Seattle, the Supreme Court had described the racial nature of Initiative 350
through three central factors: first, the political campaign surrounding enactment
of Initiative 350; second, “the perceptions of Washington voters,” and whether
these voters subjectively believed that the Initiative singled out racial busing for
unique treatment; third, the “practical effect” of the Initiative.75 This analysis
informed the district court’s description of the “racial nature” of Proposition 209
in Coalition for Economic Equity.76
For example, the district court considered how proponents of the Proposition
had characterized the initiative for voters and how these characterizations shaped
voters’ motivations for voting. The court also emphasized that the Proposition was
of “special interest” to minorities and women because it obfuscated a political
avenue for obtaining legislation that “inures primarily to the benefit of the minority,
and is designed for that purpose.”77 In terms of “practical effect,” the court focused
on how the Proposition would materially alter state practices that determine
government allocation of benefits and burdens but only in regard to race and gender
(other forms of preferential treatment would remain undisturbed).78 For all of these
reasons, the court concluded that Proposition 209 was enacted “because of” not
merely “in spite of” its adverse affects of affirmative action thereby satisfying the
threshold established in Washington v. Davis for proving discriminatory purpose.79
The second stage of the court’s analysis attended to the actual restructuring of
the political process and employed “the same comparative approach used in
Seattle.”80 Before Proposition 209, women and minorities could directly petition and
lobby specific representatives or policymakers with authority to adopt such
programs and these programs could be approved by a simple majority vote or
executive decision.81 Further significant, these channels were circumscribed within
a more localized sphere: for example, in local subdivisions of the government, such
as school districts, city councils, or county governments. Such channels provided
an opportunity for citizens to voice their discontent and potentially shape law and
policy in a more grassroots way. Moreover, this “localized” framework was more
accessible and more affordable than the path a citizen must tread for securing a
constitutional amendment through initiative:
[Proposition 209] required the collection of 693,230 valid signatures. Since
many signatures are disqualified, in order to ensure the requisite number
of valid signatures, approximately 50% more “raw” signatures must be
collected. Because these signatures must be collected within a 150–day
time limit, a campaign must typically collect up to 7,000 signatures during
each of the 150 days. Given these requirements, and the size of California,
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1504 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S at 474–75).
Id. at 1500 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S. at 470).
Id. at 1505 (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 472).
Id. at 1504 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474).
Id. at 1506 (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 471).
Id.
Id. at 1498.
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hiring paid signature gatherers is a virtual necessity. The cost of obtaining
signatures runs from $0.70 to $1.50 per signature. Thus, even where
volunteers gather some portion of the required signatures, the cost of
securing sufficient signatures, and minimally staffing a few offices, can run
from $500,000 to $1.5 million. Once the initiative has qualified, it must
gain majority approval by the voters.82
The cost and effort required to enact a constitutional amendment through the
initiative process underscored the nature of the unique political hurdles that
Proposition 209 introduced to this process for those seeking affirmative action
legislation.
Proposition 209 was therefore similar to the initiatives in Hunter and Seattle
because all three were couched in facially neutral language that masked a racial or
gender classification, grew out of controversial efforts to undermine remedial
legislation, and, most importantly, resulted in historically disenfranchised groups no
longer being able to “use the same political mechanisms that had been available
prior to the passage of the enactments.”83 Of course states remained free to
restructure the political process in neutral manners and in ways that indirectly
burdened the political participation of women and minorities. What a state could
not do was “single out an issue of special interest to minorities and women and
require that such legislation run a unique political gauntlet.”84 The perniciousness
of such legislation was measured in relation to present and future voters, for future
voters would have to reamend the state constitution to reauthorize the adoption of
programs that voters of the past had been able to adopt through far less
cumbersome modes.
The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed. Significantly, it divided equal
protection analysis into two camps: “‘conventional’ equal protection analysis, which
looks to the substance of the law at issue . . . [and] ‘political structure’ equal
protection analysis, which looks to the level of government at which the law was
enacted.”85 Under conventional equal protection analysis, the Ninth Circuit stated
that Proposition 209 was clearly constitutional.86 Rather than classifying individuals
on the basis of race or gender, the Proposition prohibited the State from classifying
on either basis and “[a] law that prohibits the State from classifying individuals by
race or gender a fortiori does not classify individuals by race or gender.”87 To this
extent, the court cast the Proposition as a race- and gender-neutral initiative that
sought to create a race- and gender-neutral world.
The court then turned to plaintiffs’ challenge that the level of government at
which the State had decided to prohibited race and gender classifications imposed

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1501.
Id. at 1510.
Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 702.
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an “unequal ‘political structure.’”88 Acknowledging that Hunter and Seattle supplied
the foundation of “political structure” equal protection analysis, the State argued
that unlike the initiatives in either case, Proposition 209 did not allocate political
authority in a discriminatory manner.89 Because minorities and women together
comprise a voting majority, the court adopted CAPD’s argument that “a majority
of the electorate cannot restructure the political process to discriminate against
itself.”90 This articulation of what constitutes a “minority” and a “majority” was
thus based on crude numbers or quantitative rather than qualitative factors.91 Unlike
the Hunter and Seattle initiatives, which focused on racial minorities, or Colorado’s
Amendment 2 in Romer v. Evans that targeted gays and lesbians,92 Proposition 209
neither targeted nor impacted a minority of the population such that political
structure equal protection analysis was an inappropriate framework for analyzing
the Proposition’s constitutionality. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit’s holding and
reasoning foreshadows the Supreme Court’s decision in Schuette.
III. SCHUETTE AND THE DEATH OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS DOCTRINE
Schuette’s path to the Supreme Court was long and arduous. In 2006, Proposal
2 was adopted during Michigan’s November general election. Conceived and
sponsored by Ward Connerly, former University of California Regent who had
previously successfully led the Proposition 209 campaign in California, and Jennifer
Gratz, the leading plaintiff in Gratz v. Bollinger,93 the Proposal aimed to ban
affirmative action in Michigan via a citizen-initiated state constitutional amendment.
It engendered legal controversy even prior to its adoption.94 A suit was filed seeking
to enjoin its placement on the general election ballot, alleging that its sponsors had
“used racially targeted voter fraud in contravention of the Voting Rights Act to
obtain signatures in support of [the] Proposal.”95 The suit proved unsuccessful but
only because the Proposal’s passage had rendered the case moot. Substantial
evidence demonstrated that the signature-gathering phase had indeed been “rife
with fraud and deception.”96
A week after the Proposal’s adoption, the Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action (the “Coalition” plaintiffs)—a student and youth-based organization

88. Id. at 703.
89. Id. at 704-05.
90. Id. at 704.
91. Id. See William M.K. Trochim, Qualitative vs. Quantitative Debate, LOYOLA MARYMOUNT
UNIV. L.A. RESEARCH ADVANCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE, http://academics.lmu.edu/irb/
qualitativeresearchandapproaches/qualitativevsquantitative/ [https://perma.cc/W22K-KNYM] (last
visited Nov. 11, 2016).
92. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
93. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
94. Operation King’s Dream v. Connerly, 501 F.3d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 2007).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 591.
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“committed to making real the promises of American democracy and equality”97—
brought an additional legal challenge to what had become Article I, section 26 of
the Michigan constitution. A month later, a group of students, faculty, and
prospective applicants to Michigan’s public universities (the “Cantrell” plaintiffs)
brought another challenge.98 Both groups argued that the Proposal violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Coalition drew upon
traditional equal protection principles and the less traditional political process
doctrine;99 the Cantrell plaintiffs challenged the Proposal solely in relation to the
doctrine first developed in Hunter and Seattle.100
In one of the most highly publicized Supreme Court opinions of the 2014
term, Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, reversed the Sixth Circuit, which
had struck down the Proposition in a highly partisan en banc decision. Although
Justice Kennedy signaled that Schuette was “not about the constitutionality, or the
merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education . . . but whether,
and in what manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit the consideration
of racial preferences in governmental decisions,”101 the wisdom of affirmative
action policies played a prominent role in the concurrences and dissents. However,
and as more fully elaborated below, Schuette’s most memorable passages concern
the merits of initiative and referenda democracy and the role of the courts in
policing these political processes. Indeed, Schuette demonstrates the extent to which
debates over the merits of affirmative action have become embroiled in discourses
pertaining to federalism, states’ rights, and the virtues of direct democracy.
Rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on Seattle and its supporting case law,
specifically Reitman v. Mulkey102—which Justice Kennedy characterized as the
“proper beginning point for discussing the controlling decisions,”103—and Hunter,
Justice Kennedy stated that Schuette was factually and legally distinct for a few
significant reasons. First, Justice Kennedy’s analysis of both Mulkey and Hunter
focused on the way that internal state political processes were conscripted to
promote private discrimination.104 The cases were thus treated as analogous to

97. The group’s full name is “Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and
Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary” (BAMN). See About BAMN,
BAMN: COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND IMMIGRATION RIGHTS
AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITY BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY, http://www.bamn.com/about-bamn
[https://perma.cc/7G4Q-RM6E] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
98. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 960
(E.D. Michigan 2008).
99. See id. at 964.
100. See id.
101. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630 (2014).
102. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
103. Id. at 1631.
104. Id. at 1631–32. In Mulkey, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the
California constitution—adopted via ballot initiative—that forbade the state from interfering in an
individual’s decision not to rent or sell residential property. The Proposition had been adopted in the
wake of legislation that aimed to regulate private discrimination in residential housing. The Court held
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Shelley v. Kraemer where the Court held that states could not enforce racial covenants
in real estate pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.105
Second, Justice Kennedy repeatedly emphasized that widespread racial
discrimination underscored the legal rationale upon which the earlier political
process cases were based.106 That is, in Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle to an extent,
evidence existed of de jure discrimination.107 In regard to Seattle, Justice Kennedy
pointed to Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved where he suggested that the
school busing policies at issue in Seattle were remnants of policies from the 1940s
and 1950s when de jure segregation was still prevalent.108 Thus, as Justice Kennedy
stated, “Seattle is best understood as a case in which the state action in question (the
bar on busing enacted by the State’s voters) had the serious risk, if not purpose, of
causing specific injuries on account of race, just as had been the case in Mulkey and
Hunter.”109 What distinguished these cases from Schuette, then, was that “the
political restriction in question [in all three cases] was designed to be used, or was
likely to be used, to encourage infliction of injury by reason of race.”110 On the other
hand, in Schuette, the Court claimed, the law at issue aimed to promote
antidiscrimination policies rather than target minorities.111
Third, Justice Kennedy suggested that “[t]he broad language used in Seattle . . .
went well beyond the analysis needed to resolve the case.”112 Justice Kennedy found
the Seattle Court’s interpretation of Hunter particularly troubling for establishing “a
new and far-reaching rationale” that whenever a government policy inured to the
benefit of minorities and altered the pathways of decision-making power, the policy
must be evaluated under strict scrutiny.113 The central problem with this rationale
was that it reinforced the notion that racial groups think and vote alike. Moreover,
the rule was ultimately unenforceable because it lacked any limiting principle and
also required courts “to determine the policy realms in which certain groups—
groups defined by race—have a political interest.”114 Thus, while not overturning
Seattle, the plurality explicitly rebuked Seattle’s doctrinal extension of Hunter.
Justice Kennedy concluded by turning his focus to direct democracy and the
importance of allowing voters to determine their own destinies. The “privilege to
enact laws” was described as “a basic exercise of . . . democratic power.”115
Michigan’s voters had used this privilege to “bypass public officials who were
that amendment violated equal protection because it “involve[d] the state in private racial
discriminations to an unconstitutional degree.” 387 U.S. at 378.
105. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
106. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1632.
107. Id. at 1633.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1638.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1634.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1635.
115. Id. at 1636.
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deemed not responsive to the concerns of a majority of the voters.”116 As Justice
Kennedy stated:
Were the Court to rule that the question addressed by Michigan voters is
too sensitive or complex to be within the grasp of the electorate; or that
the policies at issue remain too delicate to be resolved save by university
officials or faculties, acting at some remove from immediate public
scrutiny and control; or that these matters are so arcane that the electorate’s
power must be limited because the people cannot prudently exercise that
power even after a full debate, that holding would be an unprecedented
restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right held not just by one
person but by all in common. It is the right to speak and debate and learn
and then, as a matter of political will, to act through a lawful electoral
process.117
However, Respondents were not arguing that certain difficult policy questions
should be removed from the voters and from public discussion.118 Rather, they were
arguing that the removal of decision-making power from the Board of Regents, but
only with respect to its race-conscious admissions policies, restructured the existent
political process by creating comparative structural burdens that directly
corresponded to racial issues.119 Respondents recognized and indeed stressed the
fact that the Regents could have abolished race-conscious admission policies, which
would have had the same immediate substantive effect as a state constitutional
amendment outlawing affirmative action.120 The only difference was procedural: if
the Board of Regents decided to change its policy, students and individuals could
try to change the Regents’ mind through the same means employed by other
students hoping to influence admission policies. By removing the Regents’ authority
to shape its admission policies with respect to race only, however, this created two
separate political processes for students, and the distinction between these
processes was contingent upon race.
Chief Justice Roberts, who joined Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, wrote
a short, curt concurrence in which he chastised the dissent for considering it “‘out
of touch with reality’ to conclude that racial preferences may themselves [be]
debilitating effect[s] of reinforcing precisely that doubt.”121 Meanwhile, Justice
Scalia joined by Justice Thomas (neither of whom joined Justice Kennedy’s plurality
opinion) wrote a long concurrence in which he argued that Hunter and Seattle should
be overturned for being “[p]atently atextual, unadministrable, and contrary to our
traditional equal-protection jurisprudence.”122 As to the latter point, Justice Scalia
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1637.
118. See Coal. Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 36–38, Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (No. 12682), 2013 WL 4761325.
119. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d at 933.
120. Id. at 941.
121. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Sotomayor, J., dissenting
at 1675).
122. Id. at 1643 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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interpreted the political process doctrine as a species of equal protection still
utilizing a disparate impact framework. Accordingly, he suggested that the plurality
had not gone far enough in repudiating the doctrine; rather, Justice Kennedy had
“reinterpret[ed] [Hunter and Seattle] beyond recognition.”123
Unlike the plurality, Justice Scalia found Schuette to factually mirror Hunter and
Seattle: “The relentless logic of Hunter and Seattle would point to a similar conclusion
in this case. In those cases, one level of government exercised borrowed authority
over an apparently ‘racial issue,’ until a higher level of government called the loan.
So too here.”124 The plurality’s revisionist reading of the case law thus ensured that
a narrow window of opportunity remained open for striking down a law based on
its disparate impact in instances when state action posed a heightened risk of causing
specific injuries on account of race.125 Justice Scalia found this to undercut
“‘ordinary principles of our law [and] of our democratic heritage’ [which] require
‘plaintiffs alleging equal protection violations’ stemming from facially neutral acts
to ‘prove intent and causation and not merely the existence of racial disparity.’”126
For Justice Scalia, the doctrine was a relic of a bygone era in equal protection
jurisprudence, which Washington v. Davis and its progeny had “squarely and
soundly” replaced.127
Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality that the doctrine’s triggering prong, or
“the task of determining whether a law that reallocates policymaking authority
concerns a ‘racial issue,’”128 was highly troubling. What did it mean for something
to be a racial issue? And who was the correct party to decide this? Such “judicial
musing” required judges to divide the nation into “racial blocs,” a division that
necessarily assumed minorities shared certain policy interests.129 Justice Scalia found
the “racial issue” prong further problematic because it “misread” and recast the
equal protection clause as only protecting particular groups, in this case, the
minority and not the majority.130 This led the Justice to challenge the dissent’s
reliance on Carolene Products: What did it mean for a minority to be discrete and
insular, and why should this be presumptively interpreted as a political liability rather
than advantage?131
In addition to the doctrine’s triggering prong, Justice Scalia found the doctrine
and its supporting case law further problematic for “nearly swallow[ing] the rule of
structural state sovereignty”132:

123. Id. at 1642.
124. Id. at 1641.
125. See id. at 1640.
126. Id. (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 506 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
127. Id. at 1647.
128. Id. at 1643 (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 473).
129. Id. at 1643–44 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603, 610 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
130. Id. at 1644.
131. Id. at 1644–45.
132. Id. at 1646.
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If indeed the Fourteenth Amendment forbids States to “place effective
decisionmaking authority over” racial issues at “different level[s] of
government,” then it must be true that the Amendment’s ratification in
1868 worked a partial ossification of each State’s governing structure,
rendering basically irrevocable the power of any subordinate state official
who, the day before the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage, happened to
enjoy legislatively conferred authority over a “racial issue.” Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, that subordinate entity (suppose it is a city
council) could itself take action on the issue, action either favorable or
unfavorable to minorities. It could even reverse itself later. What it could
not do, however, is redelegate its power to an even lower level of state
government (such as a city-council committee) without forfeiting it, since
the necessary effect of wresting it back would be to put an additional
obstacle in the path of minorities. . . . The mere existence of a
subordinate’s discretion over the matter would work a kind of reverse preemption. It is “a strange notion—alien to our system—that local
governmental bodies can forever pre-empt the ability of a State—the
sovereign power—to address a matter of compelling concern to the State.”
But that is precisely what the political-process doctrine contemplates.133
Moreover, to the extent that citizen-initiated constitutional amendments are
an aspect of Michigan’s internal political process, Justice Scalia considered it
inappropriate to even characterize the adoption of Proposal 2 as a political
restructuring rather than “working through the ‘existing political process.’”134 After
all, Michigan citizens who supported race-conscious admissions policies could
simply reamend the state constitution through the exact same process that the
opponents of race-conscious admission policies had used to successfully ban
affirmative action: the ballot initiative. Therefore, no restructuring existed. The rules
of the game remained in place.
Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, also challenged the characterization
of Proposal 2 as working a political restructuring, but for reasons different than
Justice Scalia. Instead, he focused on how the Proposal did not shift decisionmaking authority from one political level to another, because the Regents delegated
its admission-related decision-making authority to unelected faculty members and
administrators.135 Therefore, decision-making authority shifted from an
administrative process to an electoral process, a shift that ultimately did not diminish
the ability of minorities “to participate meaningfully in the political process.”136 For
Justice Breyer, the facts of Schuette substantially deviated from Hunter and Seattle,
and to apply either case “to the administrative process would, by tending to hinder

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1647.
Id. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1651.
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change, risk discouraging experimentation, interfering with efforts to see when and
how race-conscious policies work.”137
The sole dissent, authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justice
Ginsburg, framed the plurality’s position as a “logic embrac[ing] majority rule
without an important constitutional limit.”138 Justice Sotomayor painted a portrait
of American history as one defined by persistent attempts to disenfranchise
minority voices through political restructurings. First, the majority acted with an
“open, invidious purpose,” then through “outright bans on voting with literacy
tests, good character requirements, poll taxes, and gerrymandering,” and finally
through direct democracy initiatives like Proposition 2, which changed “the ground
rules of the process so as to make it more difficult for the minority, and the minority
alone, to obtain policies designed to foster racial integration.”139 The political
process doctrine, Justice Sotomayor argued, had operated as “a central check on
majority rule” that was grounded in, and justified by, the Fourteenth
Amendment.140 Without it, minority groups in this country, historically
disenfranchised and vulnerable, were further alienated from the protections of
federal courts and the Fourteenth Amendment.
All in all, then, four of the Justices considered Hunter and Seattle factually
analogous to Schuette, the other four not. Some of the Justices believed that the
political process doctrine, and the cases upon which it relied, should be overruled
because the doctrine was inconsistent with equal protection jurisprudence in its
current form. Other Justices found the doctrine to be salvageable but only
applicable in the rarest of occasions. And still others found the doctrine
constitutionally viable despite the direction that equal protection jurisprudence had
taken.
IV. SCHUETTE’S AFTERLIFE: THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CASES
It is unclear what (if anything) of the political process doctrine survives Justice
Kennedy’s plurality decision in Schuette. As Justice Scalia and Justice Sotomayor
noted, the decision reinterpreted the seminal political process cases beyond
recognition, infusing even greater doctrinal confusion into an already complicated
body of case law.141 Perhaps this is because the cases appeared to provide an
alternative avenue for triggering heightened judicial review that did not require
proof of intent to discriminate. Thus, the doctrine appeared out-of-sync with the
direction the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has taken since Washington v.
Davis. Yet, rather than overturning Hunter and Seattle, Justice Kennedy reinterpreted
the cases, and the doctrine they developed, to stand for the proposition that when
the reapportionment of political power triggers the “infliction of a specific
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 1654 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1652.
Id. at 1667.
Id. at 1640, 1662–64.
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injury,”142 this may provide a sufficient basis for bringing an equal protection
challenge.143 It remains to be seen how this rule will be used going forward.
However, if Schuette’s immediate afterlife is any indication of its longer-lasting
contribution to the legal landscape, it is possible that the case will be remembered
and cited more for both its triumphant avowal of direct democracy and deft weaving
together of core federalist principles with voter initiatives into one cohesive
narrative. Within months of the Court’s decision in Schuette, it had been invoked by
several lower courts, almost entirely within the context of the same-sex marriage
cases, and usually because state officials tasked with defending voter-initiated samesex marriage bans have turned to Schuette for support.144 Defenders of same-sex
marriage bans have cited the case as an example of the Supreme Court’s implicit
approval of direct democracy and the importance of allowing the will of the voters
to shape their destinies without court interference.145
In Latta v. Otter, for example—a recent Idaho district court decision
overturning the state’s same-sex marriage ban—Governor Otter defended the
state’s position in part by analogizing the ban on same-sex marriage to Proposal 2’s
prohibition of affirmative action.146 Defendants interpreted Schuette to signify that
“‘a state’s voters can ban preferences’ and that courts should ‘let[ ] the people make
difficult policy choices through democratic means.’”147 The district court rejected
this analogy, suggesting that Schuette “stands for the unremarkable proposition that
voters can and should be allowed to end their state’s discriminatory policies.”148
Meanwhile, in Bostic v. Schaefer, the Fourth Circuit rejected Virginia’s argument
that a “federalism-based interest in defining marriage” was a sufficient justification
for Virginia’s prohibition against same-sex marriage.149 In a section
of the opinion entitled “Federalism,” the court found proponents’ reliance
on Schuette unavailing.150 Proponents had argued that like Proposal 2, the Marshall/
Newman Amendment outlawing same-sex marriage constituted “the codification
of Virginians’ policy choice in a legal arena that is fraught with intense social and

142. Id. at 1636 (majority opinion).
143. In one recent state appellate court case, the court interpreted the political process doctrine
post-Schuette as “stand[ing] for the proposition that the reapportionment of legislative
power may be challenged only where a serious risk of ‘specific injuries from hostile
discrimination [are] at issue.’” Howe v. Haslam, No. M2013-01790-COA-R3CV, 2014 WL 5698877, at
*23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2014).
144. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, No. CIV.A. 13-5090, 2014 WL 4347099, at *927 n.20
(E.D. La. Sept. 3, 2014) (“This case shares striking similarities with Schuette.”); Wolf v. Walker,
986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 996 (W .D. Wis. 2014) (rejecting Defendants’ and amici’s reliance on Schuette
because the case dealt with a law prohibiting rather than requiring discrimination); Latta v. Otter, 19
F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1085 (D. Idaho 2014).
145. See, e.g., Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 996; Latta, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 1085.
146. Latta, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 1085.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 379–80 (4th Cir. 2014).
150. Id. at 378–80.
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political debate.”151 The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the notion that voters could
determine the outcome on this issue. Although it acknowledged that voting was
“essential to our democracy,” the court stressed that “the people’s will is not an
independent compelling interest that warrants depriving same-sex couples of their
fundamental right to marry.”152
However, in DeBoer v. Snyder, the Sixth Circuit upheld same-sex marriage bans
in Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee, as well as Ohio’s refusal to recognize outof-state same-sex marriages.153 Judge Sutton, writing for a 2–1 majority, suggested
that the rationale underscoring Schuette “appl[ied] with equal vigor”154 to the central
question in DeBoer, namely, “Who decides? Is this a matter that the National
Constitution commits to resolution by the federal courts or leaves to the less
expedient, but usually reliable, work of the state democratic processes?”155
Borrowing greatly from Justice Kennedy’s language in Schuette, Judge Sutton’s
decision was centrally underscored by that “key insight[ ] of federalism,” which
permits states to serve as laboratories for experimenting with vastly different public
policies.156 And, indeed, throughout the decision there is palpable tension between
what Judge Sutton describes as “the democracy-versus-litigation path to same-sex
marriage”157 or the creation of laws and policies that emerge from political processes
shaped by voters as opposed to judges and courts. To invalidate same-sex marriage
bans passed by a majority of the voters would enable the federal courts to deny “the
people suffrage over an issue long thought to be within their power.”158 Allowing
voters to adopt laws or constitutional amendments through an initiative process was
thus characterized as an incisive expression of federalism and democracy at work.
Central to Judge Sutton’s decision to uphold the bans is an ironic perception
of ballot initiatives as a “purer” and more transparent form of democracy—ironic,
because our very system of representative democracy was founded out of concern
for protecting minority interests from a tyrannizing majority.159 Consider Justice
Black’s dissent in Hunter where he expressed incredulousness over the Court’s
decision to overturn a voter referendum: “In this Government, which we boast is
‘of the people, by the people, and for the people,’ conditioning the enactment of a
law on a majority vote of the people condemns that law as unconstitutional in the
eyes of the Court!”160 In James v. Valtierra, Justice Black, writing for the majority,
continued this line of defense when he argued that “[p]rovisions for referendums
151. Id. at 379.
152. Id.
153. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014).
154. Id. at 395–96, 409.
155. Id. at 396.
156. Id. at 406.
157. Id. at 402.
158. Id.
159. See, for example, Madison’s Federalist No. 51 where he suggested that “[i]f a majority be
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
( James Madison).
160. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting).
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demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice.”161
Meanwhile, Justice Scalia, in his dissent from the grant of certiorari in Equal
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, suggested that when the Court overturns a voter
referendum, it signals that “nowhere in the country may the people decide, in
democratic fashion, not to accord special protection to homosexuals,”162 as if to
suggest that the initiative form itself immunized its substance from constitutional
scrutiny.
More recently, this faith in the purity of the referenda process found life in
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Hollingsworth v. Perry.163 Disagreeing with
the majority’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ alleged lack of standing, Justice Kennedy
stated:
The essence of democracy is that the right to make law rests in the people
and flows to the government, not the other way around. Freedom resides
first in the people without need of a grant from government. The
California initiative process embodies these principles and has done so for
over a century.164
For Justice Kennedy, the plaintiffs had standing to challenge an adverse Ninth
Circuit ruling when the state refused to do so itself, because they were able to
demonstrate a sincere and personally felt injury in not having their vote counted.165
For the dissent, failing to recognize this as an injury was a direct affront to the whole
enterprise of direct democracy.166 It is hard not to read certain passages concerning
the scope of popular sovereignty in a constitutional system in Justice Kennedy’s
plurality decision in Schuette as vindicating his position in Perry.
Although direct democracy is superficially appealing, many scholars have
argued that ballot initiatives are antithetical to the structure and spirit of our
Constitution and the architecture of democracy that our Founders created.167 Direct
161. Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 141. Professor Eule recounts the following exchange during oral
argument in Reitman v. Mulkey:
[T]hen Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall called attention to the fact that California’s
authorization of discrimination in the private housing market had been enacted by voter
initiative. “Wouldn’t you have exactly the same argument,” he was asked, if the provision
“had been enacted by the California legislature?” “It’s the same argument,” Marshall replied,
“I just have more force with this.” “No,” interjected Justice Black, “It seems to me you would
have less. Because here, it’s moving in the direction of letting the people of the State—the
voters of the State—establish their policy, which is as near to a democracy as you can get.”
Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1506 (1990).
162. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that certiorari should have been denied, and that Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati is distinguishable from Romer v. Evans).
163. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2675 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2669–70.
166. Id. at 2671.
167. For critiques of direct democracy, see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct
Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293 (2007); Robin Charow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the
Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527 (1994); Gunn, supra note 2; Eule, supra
note 161, at 1555 (“The legislative process . . . affords minority groups a role that they lack in the
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democracy fails to vet unconscious bias and in so doing, facilitates the majorities’
tyranny over the minority. Direct democracy initiatives enable voters to develop and
adopt laws that legislators would likely have a far more onerous time enacting due
to their need to please their varied constituents.168 James Madison articulated a
similar point when discussing the virtues of a democratic republic. In Federalist Paper
No. 10, Madison disparaged what he termed “pure democracy” precisely because it
undermined minority interests.169 Madison argued:
A scheme of representation . . . open[ed] a different prospect . . . refin[ing]
and enlarg[ing] the public views, by passing them through the medium of
a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest
of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely
to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.170
If we return to that imagined South Dakota initiative at the start of this
Note—which required a supermajority in both Houses for the enactment of
any law pertaining to the spending of state funds in public education for
noncitizens—it is unlikely that noncitizens in South Dakota (assuming they
constituted a small minority and that they were interested in defeating this
initiative171) would ever be able to successfully defeat this law unless others in the
community joined their cause. Due to sheer numbers, as well as political access,
literacy and education, and other factors, certain groups will be uniquely
disadvantaged within the referendum and initiative process while other groups will
be at an advantage. The resultant political process will, in turn, construct a majority
that will further retrench minority interests.172 Thus, while “statewide initiative[s]
may be a legitimate process for enacting a gross receipts tax,” courts should be wary

substitutive plebiscite.”); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54
WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1978) (“[T]he experience of black [voters] with the referendum has proved
ironically that the more direct democracy becomes, the more threatening it is.”).
168. See KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 101–25 (2009)
(tracing courts’ evolving analyses of direct democracy initiatives).
169. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 ( James Madison).
170. Id.
171. Justice Kennedy devotes a considerable amount of time in his plurality decision to
critiquing the notion of racial voting blocs or the idea that minorities think alike and would vote
according to common interests. Although it is always problematic to assume that certain races or
genders favor certain social policies—e.g., that all woman favor enhanced protection from pregnancy
discrimination or that all immigrants are more favorably invested in immigration reform—it is also
naïve to discredit the fact that groups often do share common values and interests, which in turn affects
their voting patterns, particularly when they are disenfranchised within the political system. One need
only look at the voting patterns in Michigan when Proposal 2 was adopted: 59% of white voters
supported the Proposal compared with 14% of black voters. See Scott Jaschik, Michigan Votes Down
Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 8, 2006), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2006/11/08/michigan [https://perma.cc/5YCD-K3W4]. These racial differences cannot be chalked
up to statistical error; rather, they suggest that groups that considered themselves to be disadvantaged
by a particular policy were disinclined to vote favorably for that policy.
172. See Stephen M. Rich, Ruling by Political Numbers: Political Restructuring and the
Reconsideration of Democratic Commitments After Romer v. Evans, 109 YALE L.J. 587, 625–26 (1999).
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when they have the effect of “raising social barriers between groups of citizens.”173
Judicial review therefore, plays a particularly important role when direct democracy
initiatives affect, directly or indirectly, minority rights.174
V. A CASE FOR ENTRENCHMENT
But perhaps all is not lost. A different strategy for litigation may rest with an
entirely different line of case law that is nonetheless similarly preoccupied with
protecting the political process: entrenchment.
Entrenchment refers to “statutes or internal legislative rules that are binding
against subsequent legislative action in the same form.”175 Laws that are “binding”
are laws that include provisions that cannot be ignored or waived.176 Professors
Chemerinsky and Roberts identify two types of entrenchment: “substantive”
entrenchment, which constitutes “the legal (as opposed to political, social, or
economic) requirements which would completely prevent a future legislature from
amending or repealing an Act of Congress,” and “procedural” entrenchment, which
refers to legislative provisions that must be followed by future legislatures
attempting to repeal or amend the law.177 The imagined South Dakota initiative at
the start of this Note would be an example of procedural entrenchment. It does not
completely prevent future voters from modifying or repealing the initiative; rather,
it makes it exceedingly more onerous for future voters to do so.
In 1853, the Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of legislative
entrenchment in Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Debolt.178 The case concerned
whether Ohio had relinquished its right of taxation in its charter to a bank. The
Court held that this form of entrenchment was unconstitutional because “no one
legislature can, by its own act, disarm their successors of any of the powers or rights
of sovereignty confided by the people to the legislative body.”179 Therefore, no state
could form a contract that “deprive[d] a future legislature of the power of imposing
any tax it may deem necessary for the public service—or of exercising any other act

173. Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The Campaign
Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 31 (1993).
174. The Sixth Circuit emphasized this point in Equal Foundation of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D. Ohio 1993). Noting that “an essential principal of our system
of government is that fundamental constitutional rights are not subject to popular vote,” the court
stated that among its most important functions as a judiciary was “to ensure that the constitutional
rights of the few or the powerless are not infringed because their views are unpopular with the majority.”
Id. at 1236. “Without these principals,” the court remarked, “and without the independence of the
federal courts to preserve them, ours would not be a democracy at all but rather a tyranny at the whim
of the majority.” Id.
175. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE
L.J. 1665, 1667 (2002).
176. John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1778 (2003).
177. Id. at 1779.
178. 57 U.S. 416 (1853).
179. Id. at 431.
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of sovereignty confided to the legislative body” unless the constitution expressly
provided a state with this power.180
Twenty-six years later, in Newton v. Mahoney County Commissioners, the Court
acknowledged that states could enter into certain kinds of contractual obligations
that circumscribed their sovereignty.181 The Court reconfirmed the Dartmouth
College Case,182 which bolstered the Contract Clause by precluding the ability of
states to interfere with private contracts. However, Justice Swayne, writing for the
majority, drew a distinction between private contracts and contracts “involv[ing]
public interest” or which operated as “public laws.”183 The Court stated that “[e]very
succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with respect to
them as its predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and modification
which the former had of enactment, neither more nor less. All occupy, in this
respect, a footing of perfect equality.”184
The Court’s description of the problems with legislative entrenchment were
anchored in the Court’s acknowledgement that values change and that it was “vital
to the public welfare that each [legislature] should be able at all times to do whatever
the varying circumstances and present exigencies touching the subject involved may
require.”185 Entrenchment undermined the states’ abilities to repeal and modify
legislation in order to appropriately address these changing societal needs. To
enshrine the values of one set of voters and impose these values upon future voters
is not only counter-progressive but also undemocratic. No one today would want
to be bound to the views held by the majority of our country in 1896.
Numerous scholars have argued that legislative and constitutional
entrenchment is inconsistent with foundational principles of democracy.186 Current
legislatures should not be allowed to bind future legislatures. Nor should a majority
of voters today be able to bind all future voters by adopting laws that cannot be
overturned or which are uniquely cumbersome to repeal or modify. In this respect,
the idea of entrenchment provides a useful frame for understanding the issues at
stake in the political process cases including Schuette. Indeed, these cases merge the
constitutional issues surrounding entrenchment with the constitutional issues
underscoring equal protection. Although the cases articulated the equal protection
violation in relation to changing the locus of decision-making power, reallocations
of governmental decision making could also be interpreted as a species of
entrenchment.

180. Id.
181. Newton v. Mahoning Cty. Comm’rs, 100 U.S. 548, 556–57 (1879).
182. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
183. Newton, 100 U.S. at 559.
184. Id. at 559.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 176, at 1775–76 (“Entrenchment is ‘inconsistent with the
democratic principle that present majorities rule themselves.’”) (quoting Michael J. Klarman,
Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 509 (1997).
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Indeed, the political process doctrine is simultaneously a doctrine about
entrenchment. In Wilson I, for example, the district court’s concerns about
Proposition 209’s restructuring of the political process parallel concerns over the
constitutionality of legislative and constitutional forms of entrenchment.187 The way
that the Proposition subverted the ability of a particular class of voters to participate
in the political process by undermining their access to local channels of advocacy is
a version of procedural entrenchment. The issue for Judge Henderson was not just
that the Proposition repealed all existing state and local affirmative action programs,
but also that it made the adoption of such programs in the future far more difficult
to effectuate.188 Perhaps, then, as we move forward, the language and jurisprudence
of entrenchment will supply a new approach for advancing an old challenge.
CONCLUSION
Facially neutral ballot initiatives are completely ill-suited to present day
heightened judicial review for the sole reason that courts require an examination of
intent in order to sustain a finding of discrimination. The effect of this new intent
threshold has been the focus of considerable scholarly work, much of which has
been critical.189 Many laws that disparately impact minority groups have been upheld
because plaintiffs have been unable to satisfy the Court’s discriminatory purpose
requirement, leading some scholars to argue that the goals of the Fourteenth
Amendment have been lost inside the Court’s application of it.190 Moreover, in
certain contexts, discriminatory purpose is inherently more difficult if not
impossible to prove. In terms of facially neutral ballot initiatives that allegedly
disadvantage minorities, the discriminatory purpose requirement erects an obstacle
unlikely to be overcome because determining the secret motivations of voters is
nearly impossible.
An active federal judiciary is thus needed to keep direct democracy initiatives
in line with the Constitution. In Democracy and Distrust, Professor Ely suggested that
because “[t]he Constitution has . . . proceeded from the quite sensible assumption
that an effective majority will not inordinately threaten its own rights, and has
sought to assure that such a majority not systematically treat others less well than it
treats itself,”191 judges should intervene when democracy malfunctions. In order to
ensure a healthy, functioning democracy rather than any particular fundamental
values, Ely stressed the importance of protecting the procedures that sustain
democratic values.192
187. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1506–08.
188. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1506–07.
189. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After
the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569 (2002).
190. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 502–05 (2003).
191. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 100–
01 (1980).
192. Id. at 100.
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This notion was expanded in Professor Eule’s essay Judicial Review of Direct
Democracy in which he argued “the gap between the will of the majority and the
voice of the legislature is there by constitutional design,”193 but is also, ultimately,
desirable. The government has an obligation to all of its citizens. The Constitution
honors this obligation by investing plenary lawmaking authority in representatives
rather than “the people,” dividing power between different branches of government
so that each acts as a check on the other, while “placing certain principles beyond
the reach of ordinary majorities.”194 Because “direct democracy bypasses internal
safeguards designed to filter out or negate factionalism, prejudice, tyranny, and selfinterest,” judges must take “a harder look”195 at these initiatives in order to protect
“the Constitution’s representational values.”196 Eule recognized the failure of strict
scrutiny: so long as courts maintained the burden of proving discriminatory intent,
strict scrutiny would almost assuredly never apply to a ballot initiative.197 He
suggested that either this burden should be relaxed, enabling more creative ways for
satisfying it, or, in the context of plebiscitary settings, the requirements should be
abandoned altogether.198
The political process doctrine has, since its inception with Hunter,
encapsulated the tension that exists between direct democracy and judicial review
when minority rights are at stake. Direct democracy implicates unique issues
concerning the ability of voters to decide their own fate, determine their own
procedures, and be active participants in a scheme of self-government. But as our
Founders recognized, leaving the protection of minority interests to purely
majoritarian processes is contrary to our democratic values.199 If the political
process doctrine died with Schuette, the spirit of the doctrine did not, and perhaps
the jurisprudence of entrenchment provides a new avenue for ensuring that the will
of the people, important as it is, does not reign supreme.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Eule, supra note 161, at 1514.
Id. at 1549.
Id.
Id. at 1559.
Id. at 1561–62.
Id. at 1562.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 169.

